FROM THE EDITOR
On June 15, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued the first decision interpreting the 2024 amendments to DGCL Section 144 — the statute governing conflicted transactions and special committee procedural safeguards. The decision, Ayers v. Fidelity National Financial, gave boards greater certainty that incidental and immaterial director relationships will not undermine an otherwise careful and independent process. That clarity is useful. What the decision also confirms is that the foundation of M&A governance in Delaware remains what it has always been: the board that has done its preparation before the offer arrives is the board that manages the process on its own terms.
Most biotech and specialty pharma boards have not done that preparation. The 2026 M&A market — $130 billion in H1, five $10 billion-plus transactions in Q2, an IPO window that has made the dual-track a genuine alternative — has created conditions in which an unsolicited acquisition approach can arrive without warning for any company in the relevant therapeutic categories. The board that receives that approach without a governance framework in place is improvising its fiduciary duties in real time, under time pressure, against a counterparty whose deal team has been preparing for weeks.
The CLO’s role in board governance is more than corporate secretary and minute-taker. The CLO is the person who builds the framework that the board relies on when the pressure arrives. This article covers what that framework looks like — before any offer comes in, before any investment banker is engaged, and before any special committee is formed.
The board that was ready before the offer arrived negotiates the deal. The board that was not negotiates its governance.
— John LaRocca
Founding Editor | LaRocca Advisory Group
Before the Offer Arrives: The CLO’s Corporate Governance Protocol for a Company in the M&A Market
The Delaware Framework: What the Board Owes and When
Delaware corporate law governs the fiduciary obligations of directors at the overwhelming majority of publicly traded pharma and biotech companies. Understanding the framework is the CLO’s prerequisite for advising the board — not as a legal tutorial, but as the practical map of what conduct is required, what conduct is protected, and what conduct creates exposure.
Business Judgment Rule
Most board decisions in M&A receive Business Judgment Rule (BJR) deference from Delaware courts: the court presumes the directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action was in the best interest of the company. To receive BJR protection, the board must be: disinterested (no material financial interest in the transaction outcome), independent (no material relationship with a person who has a material interest), and informed (the directors reviewed material information reasonably available to them). A fully informed, uncoerced vote of a majority of disinterested shareholders approving the transaction extends BJR deference under the Corwin doctrine even where process questions exist.
Entire Fairness
When the transaction involves a controlling stockholder on both sides, or when a majority of the board is interested or not independent, the court applies the Entire Fairness standard — the most demanding standard in Delaware corporate law. To satisfy Entire Fairness, the board must demonstrate both fair dealing (a fair process) and fair price. The MFW framework — named for the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2014 Kahn v. M&F Worldwide decision — allows a controlling stockholder transaction to receive BJR review if it is conditioned from the outset on both independent special committee approval and a majority-of-the-minority shareholder vote. The June 2026 DGCL Section 144 amendments codified and clarified this framework.
The June 2026 Section 144 Decision: What Changed
The June 15, 2026 Ayers decision interpreted the 2024 DGCL Section 144 amendments for the first time. The Delaware Court of Chancery confirmed that the amendments provide greater certainty for disinterested boards invoking the business judgment rule and for navigating conflicted transactions through special committees. Specifically: incidental and immaterial director relationships — the kinds of relationships that plaintiff’s counsel had used to challenge director independence in prior cases — will not automatically disqualify a director from participating in a special committee. The test remains materiality. The decision clears procedural uncertainty that had accumulated around director independence challenges and strengthens the defensive value of a well-designed special committee.
What the decision does not change: the foundational obligation to run a process that is independent, informed, and genuinely focused on maximizing stockholder value. Procedural fortification substitutes for none of that.
The Special Committee: Design Before You Need It
The single most consequential governance decision in a change-of-control transaction is whether to form a special committee, and if so, how to design it. Most boards make this decision under time pressure, after an offer has arrived. The CLO should have the design framework ready before any offer exists.
When to Form a Special Committee
A special committee is warranted whenever a majority of the full board cannot be considered disinterested and independent with respect to the transaction — because of their relationship with the potential acquirer, because of their equity interests in the transaction outcome, or because of any other material interest that distinguishes them from a disinterested stockholder. A special committee is also warranted in controlling stockholder situations even where the full board is disinterested, because the MFW framework requires it to achieve BJR review. Outside those clear cases, forming a special committee in a transaction where the full board is disinterested and independent can be a defensive choice — the clarity of a defined committee with an explicit mandate and independent advisors is more defensible than a full board process if the transaction is later challenged.
A common CLO mistake: waiting to assess whether a special committee is needed until after the offer arrives. By the time the offer is on the table, the board is operating under information that may be material and non-public, time pressure from the counterparty, and the need to respond without appearing to ignore its fiduciary duties. The pre-M&A readiness protocol should include a written director independence assessment, updated annually, that identifies which directors would be disinterested and independent in a hypothetical change-of-control transaction. That document is the starting point for the special committee design when an offer arrives.
Who Sits on the Special Committee
Special committee members must be independent — they cannot have a material relationship with the counterparty, with management who would benefit from the transaction, or with any other party whose interests diverge from those of the disinterested stockholders. Post-Section 144, incidental relationships are not disqualifying. Material ones are. The committee should have at least two members, and three is better — not for voting mechanics, but because a two-person committee whose members disagree produces a governance impasse at the worst possible time.
The committee members should have, between them, the expertise to evaluate the transaction substantively — M&A experience, familiarity with the therapeutic area, and the financial sophistication to engage meaningfully with the fairness opinion. A committee whose members have no independent view of the transaction’s merits is a committee that is entirely dependent on its advisors, which is a weaker governance structure than one that can interrogate the advisors’ work.
The Committee’s Mandate and Authority
The special committee’s mandate — the resolution establishing it — must give it full board authority to negotiate, reject, and recommend on the transaction. A committee that can only recommend and not negotiate is a process committee, not a decision committee, and Delaware courts have given less deference to process committees whose authority was constrained. The mandate should also give the committee the authority to retain its own independent legal and financial advisors — separate from those serving management or the full board — and to have those advisors report directly to the committee, not through management.
The Fairness Opinion
The fairness opinion — an investment bank’s opinion that the consideration offered is fair, from a financial point of view, to the company’s unaffiliated stockholders — is a standard element of M&A governance in pharmaceutical and biotech transactions. It addresses the duty of care element of the board’s analysis by providing expert support for the price determination. The CLO should understand what a fairness opinion does and does not do: it opines on financial fairness, not on whether the transaction is the best strategic outcome for the company, not on whether a higher price was available, and not on whether the process was adequate. The board’s process is separate from the fairness opinion.
The CLO’s Pre-M&A Board Governance Checklist
The following checklist should be completed and updated annually, regardless of whether any acquisition discussion is underway. Its purpose: to ensure the board is prepared to respond to an unsolicited approach with a governance framework already in place rather than being constructed in real time.
Director Independence Assessment
• Current mapping of every director’s relationships with potential acquirers (strategic and PE) in the company’s relevant therapeutic category
• Documentation of all director equity holdings, including unvested equity that would accelerate on a change of control
• Documentation of all director relationships with management, including compensation committee members’ roles in setting executive compensation
• Identification of the two or three directors who would be disinterested and independent in any transaction with any plausible acquirer — the pre-selected special committee pool
• Annual update of this assessment, with the CLO signing off on the independence conclusions
Board Education on Fiduciary Duties in M&A
• Annual board session — separate from ordinary board meeting — on Delaware M&A fiduciary duty framework: Business Judgment Rule, Entire Fairness, Corwin, MFW, and the Section 144 DGCL amendments
• Board materials explaining what happens when an unsolicited offer arrives: who the offer goes to, who is notified, what the timeline looks like, and what the board’s obligations are in the first 24-48 hours
• Written policy on how the board handles preliminary inquiries: who can communicate with potential acquirers, what can be said, and when the full board must be convened
• Director education on Regulation FD and insider trading obligations in the M&A context — who is in the information barrier and from what point
D&O Insurance Adequacy Review
• Annual review of D&O policy limits against the transaction sizes at which the company could realistically be acquired — the policy that was adequate at a $200 million market cap is inadequate at $2 billion
• Confirmation that the D&O policy includes run-off coverage (the ‘tail’) that protects directors post-closing for pre-closing acts — standard in acquisition transactions but must be confirmed and sized correctly
• Identification of the exclusions that would limit coverage in a challenged transaction — including the conduct exclusion (intentional wrongdoing), the insured-versus-insured exclusion, and any M&A-specific exclusions
• Understanding of the policy’s treatment of derivative claims versus direct claims — derivative claims typically require shareholder demand, direct claims do not
Books and Records Readiness
• Board minutes current and complete — the minutes of every meeting at which the company’s strategic direction, M&A activity, or any unsolicited inquiry was discussed are the evidentiary record of the board’s process
• Written record of any prior discussions with investment bankers about the company’s strategic alternatives, including any informal discussions
• Retention policy for board materials current and confirmed — board packages, presentations, and supporting materials must be preserved and retrievable
THE AUGUST 2026 PBC DECISION: A NOTE FOR LIFE SCIENCES COMPANIES WITH DUAL MISSIONS
On July 29, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued the first decision addressing PBC (public benefit corporation) director fiduciary duties in a change-of-control transaction. The court confirmed that PBC directors must balance the interests of stockholders, other stakeholders, and the company’s public benefit — but found that this balance does not require PBC directors to prioritize the benefit mission over stockholder value in a change-of-control context. The decision is significant for the growing number of life sciences companies that have adopted PBC status, many of which are in the rare disease and global health space. CLOs at PBC biotech companies should review the decision and confirm that board education on fiduciary duties reflects the PBC’s specific statutory framework under DGCL Section 365.
WORKSTREAM 1 IMMEDIATE
Conduct the Director Independence Assessment and Document It
The director independence assessment is the governance foundation for every other element of M&A readiness. Without it, the CLO cannot answer the basic question that determines the entire process architecture: who on this board could sit on a special committee in a transaction with Acquirer X? The assessment must be current — meaning updated within the last 12 months — and must cover the full universe of plausible acquirers, not just the ones currently in deal discussions. For a specialty pharma company in cardiovascular disease, the plausible acquirer universe includes every large cap pharma with a CVD gap, every PE fund with a cardiovascular platform, and every China-origin licensor with U.S. commercialization ambitions. Map each director against each plausible acquirer category. Document the independence conclusion for each. Sign off on the document as CLO. Put it in the board file with a date. Update it annually.
BUSINESS IMPACT: An offer arrives on a Tuesday morning. The board chair calls the CLO before calling anyone else. The CLO’s first answer needs to be: here are the three directors who are disinterested and independent for purposes of a special committee. Without the assessment, that answer requires legal analysis under time pressure that produces worse results than analysis done in advance.
WORKSTREAM 2 NEAR-TERM
Run the Annual Board Fiduciary Duty Education Session
The annual board fiduciary duty session is not a compliance exercise. It is the CLO’s investment in the board’s ability to function correctly under pressure. A board that has never discussed what happens when an unsolicited offer arrives will make procedural mistakes in the first 48 hours — communicating selectively with the counterparty in ways that create Reg FD exposure, discussing the offer in a setting that is not a properly convened board meeting, or taking actions that appear responsive to the offer before a governance structure is in place. The session should cover: the Business Judgment Rule and what is required to maintain it; the Corwin doctrine and why the shareholder vote matters for litigation purposes; the special committee design questions and what the committee needs to function properly; Reg FD obligations from the moment material non-public information is shared; and the director’s personal D&O insurance protection and its limits. The session should be conducted by the CLO with outside M&A counsel presenting. It should be minuted. It should occur in the fall of each year — before the JPMorgan Healthcare Conference in January, when deal discussions that have been developing since Q3 often surface publicly.
BUSINESS IMPACT: A board that has never discussed its M&A fiduciary duties before a specific transaction arises will discuss them for the first time under time pressure, with a potential counterparty waiting for a response. The board that has done the education advances the deal on its own terms.
WORKSTREAM 3 NEAR-TERM
Review and Right-Size the D&O Insurance Program
The D&O insurance adequacy review is the governance workstream most commonly deferred until after the transaction is already in process — which is too late. The specific questions for the annual review: What are the current policy limits, and do they reflect the company’s current market cap and the transaction sizes at which it could realistically be acquired? Does the policy include D&O run-off coverage (the tail policy) that protects directors post-closing for pre-closing acts, and is the tail period adequate? Most tail policies run three to six years. For a transaction that results in securities litigation, three years may not be enough. What are the policy’s primary exclusions, and are there M&A-specific exclusions that would limit coverage in a transaction that is later challenged? The CLO should review the D&O policy with the company’s insurance broker annually, not just at renewal. The broker sees what is happening in the D&O market; the CLO brings the governance context.
BUSINESS IMPACT: A director who serves on a special committee in a transaction that is later challenged in Delaware Court of Chancery is a defendant in that litigation regardless of the merits. The D&O policy is their defense fund. An inadequate policy at the time the claim arises is not a problem that can be fixed retroactively.
“The board that was ready before the offer arrived negotiates the deal. The board that was not negotiates its governance.”
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
John LaRocca is a pharma and biotech attorney with 26 years of in-house experience, including CLO/GC tenures at Actavis, Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Aerie Pharmaceuticals, and Y-mAbs Therapeutics. He is the founding partner of LaRocca Advisory Group, a boutique fractional CLO services firm. The GC Playbook reflects his personal views and does not constitute legal advice.
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