Issue 2 — The Strategic Alternatives Review, Decoded
Pre-Sale Playbook · M&A · Board Governance
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“The board has authorized management to explore strategic alternatives with the assistance of [Banker], including potential business combinations, acquisitions, or other transactions.”
That single sentence — usually buried in the 8-K announcing it — is one of the most consequential governance events a public commercial-stage pharma or biotech company can undergo. It is also one of the least well-understood by the executives now obligated to execute it.
This is Part 2 of the Pre-Sale Playbook series. Part 1 covered the eighteen months before the banker arrives. This issue is about what happens once the banker is in the room.
1. What actually triggered this — and why it matters.
There are roughly four reasons a board authorizes a strategic alternatives review, and the trigger reveals more about the negotiating position than any banker pitch deck.
— Inbound interest. A credible bidder has reached out. The board is responding to a real opportunity. Negotiating leverage: strong. Process tempo: fast.
— Sponsor exit. A PE sponsor is approaching the end of a fund cycle and the board has been gently reminded that there is an exit timeline. Negotiating leverage: medium. Process tempo: deliberate.
— Activist pressure. A 13D filer is pushing for “value-creating alternatives.” Negotiating leverage: variable; depends on whether the activist’s narrative is sound. Process tempo: pressured.
— Capital constraints. The company is running short of runway and the board is faced with the choice of dilutive financing or a sale. Negotiating leverage: weakest. Process tempo: fastest.
The General Counsel needs to be in the room when the board articulates which of these triggers is operative — not because the GC is going to write the strategy, but because the SEC disclosure record will eventually need to align with the actual rationale. If the 8-K says “exploring strategic alternatives” and the proxy six months later describes the trigger differently, plaintiffs’ counsel will notice.
2. The transaction committee, and why you should staff it carefully.
The board’s first procedural step is usually to establish a transaction committee — typically three to five independent directors who will quarterback the review on behalf of the full board. The committee will receive banker reports, evaluate bids, and ultimately recommend (or not) a transaction.
The GC’s role here is critical and underdiscussed. The committee will be making decisions that, in any reasonably contested transaction, will end up litigated. The Delaware Court of Chancery is going to read every set of committee minutes, every banker presentation, every email between committee members. Your job is to ensure those records, when read three years from now, support the conclusion that the committee discharged its fiduciary duties.
In practice, that means:
— Tight minutes that record what was decided, not just what was discussed.
— Banker presentations preserved as drafts and finals, with version control.
— Independent legal counsel for the committee — not just the company’s outside corporate counsel.
— A clean record of why each material decision was made, particularly decisions to accept or reject specific bidders or proposals.
The board’s choice of who sits on the transaction committee is a strategic decision, not just a procedural one. Directors who would attract Revlon scrutiny — recent appointees of the largest holder, directors with relationships to potential bidders, directors with disclosed conflicts — should not be on the committee, even if they would otherwise be the most engaged on a sale process.
3. The banker mandate, and what to fight for in the engagement letter.
The board’s second procedural step is to engage a financial advisor. The mandate document — typically 8 to 15 pages — looks like boilerplate. It is not. Three provisions matter disproportionately:
— Tail provisions. If the bank introduces a buyer who closes the deal six months after termination of the mandate, does the bank still get paid? In what form? Negotiating this carefully can save the company seven figures in a marginal case.
— Fee structure. Most M&A engagement letters have a base fee plus an incentive that scales with deal value. The kink in the scale — where the incentive accelerates — is a negotiation, not a rule.
— Conflicts representations. The bank should represent that it is not advising a likely bidder. If the bank is advising a likely bidder, that relationship should be carved out with clear ethical-wall provisions.
The GC reviews the engagement letter. The GC should also push the banker to disclose, in writing, the universe of likely bidders and the bank’s relationship with each. That disclosure becomes part of the litigation record later.
4. “Process” or “negotiated transaction” — the most important early decision.
Once the banker is engaged, the transaction committee faces a binary choice that will shape the entire review: run a “process” (multiple bidders, structured timeline, formal bid procedures) or pursue a “negotiated transaction” (single bidder, exclusivity, expedited diligence).
Each has costs and benefits. A process maximizes the chance of a high price but takes 4–8 months and exposes the company to leak risk. It also requires the company to function in a state of suspended animation. A negotiated transaction is faster, cleaner, and lower-leak-risk — but if the buyer knows you are not running a process, the price tends to compress.
The general rule, with many exceptions: if you have inbound interest from a clearly motivated strategic acquirer at a credible price, negotiated is often better. If the bidder universe is broad and the company has the operational stamina, a process is often better.
The Delaware case law on this is well-developed and not particularly forgiving. A board that runs a negotiated transaction needs to be able to articulate why it concluded a process would not have yielded a better outcome. The GC writes the memo that captures that conclusion.
5. Fiduciary out — what it actually does.
Every public-company M&A practitioner knows the phrase “fiduciary out.” Fewer can articulate exactly what it does.
In a typical no-shop merger agreement, the seller’s board agrees not to solicit competing bids — but reserves the right to consider, and if necessary, recommend, an unsolicited “superior proposal” from a third party. The fiduciary out is the mechanism by which the board can change its recommendation in response to a superior proposal without breaching the merger agreement. Critical details:
— What constitutes a “superior proposal”? Usually defined as one the board, in good faith, determines is reasonably likely to be consummated and is more favorable to stockholders.
— How long must the board give the original buyer to “match”? Usually three to five business days.
— What is the termination fee if the board exercises the fiduciary out? Usually 2.5%–3.5% of equity value.
These provisions look technical but they determine, in practice, whether the deal you sign is the deal you close. A well-drafted fiduciary out preserves optionality. A poorly drafted one locks the board in.
What to do this week
If your board is anywhere near a strategic alternatives review, three concrete actions for this week:
— Identify which of the four triggers actually applies to your situation, and make sure the board’s emerging narrative aligns.
— Draft a memo to the board on the composition of the transaction committee — who should be on it, who should not, and why.
— Pull last week’s banker engagement letter (yours or a recent comparable) and red-line the tail, fee, and conflicts provisions.
In Part 3 of this series, I will cover the balance-sheet cleanup the buyer’s diligence team will conduct on your company — and how to do that cleanup yourself, on your timeline, before they get to it.
For boards and CEOs running a strategic alternatives review without a GC who has been through one, LaRocca Advisory Service provides fractional CLO engagements specifically for this window. Reply to this email.
— John


