FROM THE EDITOR
Shareholder activism ended 2025 with more than 255 campaigns — up 40% from 2024, the third consecutive year in which more than 1,000 companies were targeted globally. Elliott Management alone launched 18 campaigns in 2025 and 12 in the first half of 2026. Starboard Value won five board seats in Q1 2026 through cooperation agreements with Fox Factory, Phillips 66, Norwegian Cruise Line, and J.M. Smucker among others. In healthcare, Kenvue — the J&J consumer health spinout — was targeted simultaneously by Starboard, Third Point, and Toms Capital Management, ultimately agreeing to be acquired by Kimberly-Clark at a valuation of nearly $49 billion.
The pharma and biotech sector’s vulnerability to activist campaigns in 2026 is structural, not coincidental. It has three specific drivers. First, patent cliff pressure: looming LOE events force boards to demonstrate a pipeline replenishment strategy, and activists who believe the board is pursuing that strategy too slowly or too expensively have a credible public thesis. Second, IRA pricing reform: the Maximum Fair Price program has compressed the commercial window for branded small molecules in a way that changes the NPV of existing assets and the logic of the M&A strategy the board should pursue. Third, the M&A market itself: the H1 2026 deal wave demonstrated that assets in the right therapeutic categories are genuinely scarce, and activists who believe a company’s board failed to capture that value — either by selling too cheaply, by not selling when it should have, or by overpaying for acquisitions that did not deliver — have a specific, factual campaign thesis.
In 2026, M&A activism accounts for 64% of all campaigns in Q4 — the highest proportion in five years. Every pharma and biotech board needs a pre-campaign governance framework in place before the activist’s first letter arrives.
— John LaRocca
Founding Editor | LaRocca Advisory Group
Shareholder Activism in Pharma and Biotech: The 2026 Campaign Wave, the M&A Thesis, and the CLO’s Pre-Campaign Governance Protocol
The 2026 Activism Landscape: What Changed and What Did Not
The headline statistics from Barclays’ H1 2026 Review of Shareholder Activism are consistent with a market that has not returned to baseline after the 2025 surge: 255 campaigns in 2025 (up 40% from 2024), M&A-thesis campaigns rising to 64% of all Q4 2025 campaigns — the highest proportion in five years — and Elliott and Starboard together accounting for nearly three-quarters of major campaign activity in H1 2026.
What the data also shows: the sector distribution has shifted. Technology drew the most campaigns in H1 2026 at roughly 21% of all campaigns, up from 12% a year earlier. Healthcare runs second at roughly 19%. The shift of activism toward technology does not reduce healthcare’s exposure — it reflects a broader market in which every sector with identifiable underperformance gaps, M&A optionality, and a board that can be characterized as insufficiently responsive is a credible target.
The specific pharma and biotech activism thesis in 2026 is the M&A thesis: the target company’s board has either failed to pursue the strategic alternatives that the current M&A market has made available, has failed to sell at a premium it was offered, or has overpaid for an acquisition that destroyed value instead of creating it. All three of those campaign theses are specific to the 2026 pharma market’s conditions.
The Three Pharma-Specific Vulnerability Factors
Patent Cliff Pressure
A company whose largest commercial product faces LOE within 3-5 years and whose pipeline does not have a Phase 3 program capable of replacing the revenue is a company with an identifiable strategic problem that the activist can quantify. The activist’s thesis is simple: the market has discounted the stock for the patent cliff, the board’s response has been inadequate, and the company should either pursue M&A to replace the revenue or put itself up for sale. Elliott’s approach at Pfizer — where it raised its holding to 8.5 million shares while publicly criticizing the company’s underperformance — is the current model for large-cap pharma activism driven by patent cliff pressure.
The CLO’s specific role: before any activism campaign is launched, the CLO should have advised the board on the strategic alternatives analysis that the activist will demand. A board that has considered and documented its analysis of strategic alternatives — including M&A, licensing, divestitures, and standalone execution — is a board that can respond to an activist’s demand for a strategic review with a substantive answer rather than an agreement to do something it should have already done.
IRA Maximum Fair Price Pressure
The IRA’s MFP program creates a specific vulnerability for any company with a large-population small molecule whose Medicare pricing will be compressed beginning within the next 3-5 years. An activist who can model the MFP impact on the company’s revenue projections and identify a gap between the board’s public guidance and the MFP-adjusted financial reality has a specific, quantified campaign thesis. Parvus Asset Management’s engagement with Novo Nordisk — building a stake amid concerns that the company may be losing its early lead in the weight-loss drug market — is a version of this thesis applied to the GLP-1 franchise.
Operational Performance and Cost Structure
Operational and margin pressure creates activism vulnerability independently of patent cliff and IRA exposure. Charles River Laboratories reached an agreement with Elliott in May 2025 to add four directors and conduct a strategic review. Avantor came under pressure from Engine Capital to bring in new directors, cut costs, and evaluate strategic options including a potential sale. Medtronic appointed two new directors in response to Elliott’s engagement. Becton Dickinson’s Starboard engagement produced a $17.5 billion Reverse Morris Trust separation of its life sciences division. Each of these campaigns followed a pattern: identifiable performance gap, specific remediation demand, cooperation agreement or proxy contest. The CLO’s governance posture should anticipate this pattern rather than respond to it.
The Defensive Framework: What the Board Should Have in Place
Advance Notice Bylaws
Advance notice bylaws are the most basic structural defense against a proxy contest. They require a shareholder who intends to nominate a director or present a proposal at the annual meeting to provide written notice within a specified window — typically 60-90 days before the anniversary of the prior year’s annual meeting. The advance notice window gives the board time to evaluate the shareholder’s nominees, engage advisors, and prepare a response before the proxy season begins.
Delaware courts have consistently upheld advance notice bylaws when they are reasonable and not used to disenfranchise shareholders. The specific drafting considerations in 2026: the advance notice bylaw should require the nominating shareholder to provide detailed disclosure about its economic interest in the company (including derivatives, swaps, and other instruments that create economic exposure without voting rights — the ‘wolf pack’ disclosure concern); the background and qualifications of any director nominees; and any agreement or arrangement between the nominating shareholder and its nominees. Advance notice bylaws that were last updated before 2020 are likely inadequate against the disclosure sophistication of the 2026 activist.
Shareholder Rights Plan (Poison Pill) — Current Delaware Status
A shareholder rights plan — the poison pill — is a defensive mechanism that dilutes the ownership of any shareholder who acquires above a specified threshold (typically 15-20%) without board approval. Delaware courts upheld the use of poison pills in the pandemic era and have continued to uphold them when they are adopted with a legitimate defensive purpose and not used to entrench management against a fully priced acquisition offer.
The 2026 consideration: a poison pill that has not been reviewed by current outside counsel in the prior 12 months may have structural provisions that current Delaware case law has made less defensible. The ‘morning-in-America’ provision, the grandfathering threshold, the definition of acting in concert, and the passive investor exemption for index funds are the specific provisions that should be reviewed annually against current Delaware precedent. The CLO should confirm the company has a current poison pill review on file, not a plan adopted in 2019 that has never been updated.
The Cooperation Agreement: Negotiating the Alternative to a Proxy Contest
Most activism campaigns in 2026 end in a cooperation agreement rather than a proxy contest. A cooperation agreement typically provides: the activist receives one or more board seats (either from its own nominees or from a mutually agreed independent director); the activist agrees to standstill provisions that limit its ability to acquire additional shares, make additional public demands, or support competing proposals for a specified period; the company commits to certain governance changes or process reviews requested by the activist; and both parties agree to keep the terms of the cooperation confidential.
The specific negotiation points that protect the board: the information-sharing agreement embedded in the cooperation agreement (what financial and strategic information does the activist director receive in their capacity as a director, and what fiduciary duties does that create?); the standstill provisions (how long does the activist agree not to launch additional campaigns?); and the scope of any strategic review commitment — a commitment to ‘evaluate strategic alternatives’ that has no defined scope, timeline, or outcome criteria is an open-ended obligation that the activist will use as leverage for additional demands.
WORKSTREAM 1 IMMEDIATE
Conduct the Activism Vulnerability Assessment Before the Proxy Season
The activism vulnerability assessment is the CLO’s annual contribution to the board’s governance preparation. It answers four questions: does the company have an identifiable performance gap relative to its sector peers that an activist could quantify and present to institutional shareholders? Does the company’s current LOE timeline, IRA exposure, or pipeline status create a M&A thesis — the argument that the board should have pursued M&A and has not, or that the board should explore a sale? Are the company’s advance notice bylaws current against 2026 Delaware precedent and adequate to protect the board’s ability to respond to a campaign with appropriate preparation time? Does the company have a current poison pill reviewed against current Delaware case law, or an outdated plan that provides less structural protection than the board believes? The assessment is completed by the CLO and outside M&A and corporate governance counsel before November each year, ahead of the January-February proxy season.
BUSINESS IMPACT: A board that receives an activist’s public letter without a current vulnerability assessment, an updated advance notice bylaw, and a reviewed poison pill is a board that is responding to governance pressure in real time. The boards in the Kenvue, Becton Dickinson, and Charles River situations that ended in major structural changes did not have the luxury of a governance framework they had built in advance.
WORKSTREAM 2 NEAR-TERM
Update the Advance Notice Bylaw and Confirm the Poison Pill Status
Before the next proxy season, confirm the advance notice bylaw has been reviewed by outside governance counsel against current Delaware precedent and the 2026 activist information-request practices. The specific provisions to update: the disclosure requirement for economic interests (including derivatives and instruments without voting rights); the background and qualification disclosure requirement for director nominees; and the acting-in-concert definition (which must capture the wolf pack aggregation of activist positions held through related entities). Separately, confirm the poison pill status: is there a current pill in place, and when was it last reviewed? If the pill was adopted more than three years ago and has not been reviewed against current Delaware case law, commission a review by outside counsel. A pill that contains outdated structural provisions may not provide the board with the protective trigger at the threshold the board believes it does.
BUSINESS IMPACT: The advance notice bylaw and the poison pill are the structural defenses that determine whether an activist can mount a proxy campaign on their own timeline or must proceed on the company’s timeline. The company whose governance documents give the board adequate preparation time negotiates from a position of relative strength. The one whose documents are outdated does not.
WORKSTREAM 3 STRATEGIC
Build the First-Response Protocol for an Activist Communication
The first 48 hours after receipt of an activist’s letter or public demand determine the tone and trajectory of the campaign. Build the first-response protocol before any activist communication arrives. The protocol covers: who at the company is authorized to communicate with the activist and on what timeline; who is authorized to communicate with the media, investment community, and institutional shareholders; the engagement of outside M&A counsel and proxy advisory specialists (ISS and Glass Lewis relationships matter in a campaign, and the proxy advisors should be identified and a relationship established in advance, not in response to a campaign); the board notification protocol and the special committee consideration (should a special committee of disinterested directors manage the response?); and the first written response — is it a no-comment, an engagement offer, or a substantive rebuttal, and who approves it? The first-response protocol should be a two-to-three page document reviewed annually and updated for any material change in the company’s governance or strategic position.
BUSINESS IMPACT: The activist’s first letter is designed to be made public immediately if the company does not respond quickly and credibly. The company that has a response protocol ready produces a coherent, coordinated response within 24 hours. The company that does not spends those 24 hours in an improvised internal debate while the activist’s narrative sets the public frame.
“M&A activism accounts for 64% of all Q4 2025 campaigns — the highest proportion in five years. The pharma board that has not built its pre-campaign governance framework is operating without the tools it will need when the activist’s letter arrives.”
For interested readers, I have created a Shareholder Activism Defense Protocol. It can be found at laroccaadvisory.gumroad.com/
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
John LaRocca is a pharma and biotech attorney with 26 years of in-house experience, including CLO/GC tenures at Actavis, Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Aerie Pharmaceuticals, and Y-mAbs Therapeutics. He is the founding partner of LaRocca Advisory Group, a boutique fractional CLO services firm. The GC Playbook reflects his personal views and does not constitute legal advice.

