FROM THE EDITOR
The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance blog published an analysis in March 2026 of 75 concluded activist campaigns in the life sciences sector since January 2024. The finding that matters most for CLOs advising biotech and specialty pharma boards: 34% of those campaigns preceded the company’s acquisition or dissolution. That is not a coincidence. It is the activist thesis playing out — identify a company with a governance or strategic failure, launch the campaign, force the strategic process that the board failed to pursue on its own, and capture the premium.
The life sciences and healthcare sector drew 31 activist campaigns in 2025 — 12% of a record 255 total worldwide. Four of the six biotech targets who drew activist attention in 2025 came under pressure to refresh their boards, replace CEOs, or amend bylaws. A Diligent analysis of biotech activism identified the specific vulnerability pattern: biotech boards typically have considerable scientific depth but lack capital markets or operational expertise. That gap — a board that can evaluate a Phase 3 readout but cannot credibly defend a capital allocation decision to a sophisticated institutional investor — is the specific opening that activists enter through.
I have sat in enough board meetings to understand what this looks like from the inside. The board room where the most senior voice on a PDUFA date is a former FDA medical officer, and the most senior voice on a capital allocation decision is the CFO who also manages investor relations, is a board room that has a governance problem. The deficit is not intelligence or commitment. It is the specific combination of capital markets experience, M&A execution history, and institutional investor relationship depth that makes a board credibly defensible to a sophisticated activist.
The CLO’s role in closing that gap is not to find new board members. It is to conduct the analysis that shows the board where the gap is before the activist’s 13D arrives.
— John LaRocca
Founding Editor | LaRocca Advisory Group
The Data: What 75 Concluded Campaigns Reveal
The Harvard Law Corporate Governance analysis of 75 concluded campaigns in life sciences since January 2024 produces a dataset that should be required reading for every biotech CLO. Among those 75 campaigns: 34% preceded the company’s acquisition or dissolution. 17% ended in formal settlement agreements — cooperation agreements in which the activist received board representation in exchange for a standstill. 12% achieved other objectives — share repurchases, board changes, management transitions — without a formal settlement. 11% reached partial success through informal understandings. Only 9% proceeded to a shareholder vote. 17% were abandoned without the activist achieving its stated objectives.
The 34% acquisition rate is the number that defines the activist strategy in life sciences. Elliott, Sarissa, Velan, ADAR1 Capital, and the other repeat activists in the sector are not running governance improvement campaigns. They are running strategic alternatives campaigns with governance as the entry thesis. The governance critique — insufficient capital markets expertise, excessive director tenure, CEO and chair combination — is the platform that persuades institutional investors to support an activist nomination. The acquisition or strategic process is the monetization event.
The CLO who understands this treats the activism vulnerability assessment as an M&A readiness assessment. The question is not whether the board can govern effectively in steady state. The question is whether the board’s composition and governance structure can withstand the specific scrutiny that an activist deploys before filing a 13D.
The Three Biotech-Specific Vulnerability Factors
1. Scientific-Depth Boards Without Capital Markets Expertise
The Diligent analysis of 2025 biotech activism identifies this as the primary governance gap that activists exploit: biotech boards are built for scientific oversight of drug development and regulatory strategy. The directors with the most credibility — former FDA officials, academic scientists with the relevant disease expertise, former pharma R&D executives — are the right directors for evaluating a Phase 3 readout, a CRL response strategy, or a clinical program prioritization decision. They are the wrong directors for defending a capital allocation decision, evaluating a strategic alternatives analysis, or credibly representing the board’s M&A process to an institutional investor audience.
The activist campaign built on this gap targets the board’s capital allocation decisions: the decision to advance a program that has consumed three times its original budget; the decision to build commercial infrastructure for a drug that has not yet received approval; the decision not to pursue an acquisition or partnership that would have extended the runway; or the decision to maintain a cash position rather than return it to shareholders. Each of these decisions requires capital markets expertise to defend credibly. A board that cannot put a director with direct buy-side or sell-side experience in front of an institutional investor to defend the company’s capital allocation framework is a board that is vulnerable on that specific dimension.
The board composition test: can at least one board member — not the CFO, not management, but an independent director — credibly describe to a sophisticated activist investor why the company’s capital allocation decisions have been the right ones? If the answer is no, the gap is real and the campaign thesis is available.
2. Cash Runway Pressure and Development-Stage Dilution Risk
For development-stage biotech companies — companies pre-commercial or early commercial with a cash runway measured in quarters — the activist campaign thesis is arithmetic. Higher R&D costs or unexpected clinical delays accelerate burn, reduce runway, increase dilution risk from the next financing, and strengthen the activist argument that the board should rationalize the pipeline, pursue a licensing transaction, or explore a strategic sale before the next financing dilutes existing shareholders.
The Diligent analysis describes this precisely: cash runway concerns accelerate the activist’s case for capital allocation discipline, portfolio rationalization, or strategic alternatives. At development-stage companies, this is often the decisive vulnerability factor. A board that has not publicly articulated a clear framework for pipeline prioritization against its runway timeline — including the specific clinical milestones that will trigger a strategic alternatives review — is a board that has left the activist’s thesis unanswered before the campaign launches.
The advance answer: a board-level strategic alternatives policy that documents the specific conditions under which the board will formally initiate a strategic alternatives review is the governance document that closes this vulnerability before the activist demands it. The policy does not need to be public. Its existence needs to be articulable by the board’s directors to institutional investors who ask the question.
3. Long-Tenured Directors and Governance-Focused Activism
The Harvard analysis identifies board refreshment as a consistent activism demand: four of six biotech targets in 2025 drew pressure to refresh boards, replace CEOs, or amend bylaws. ISS governance trends for 2026 show a slight increase in the number of U.S. companies with separate chair and CEO positions — a governance norm that ISS and Glass Lewis increasingly enforce through director vote recommendations.
The long-tenured director is the specific governance profile that activates ISS’s negative recommendation framework. A director who has served for more than 12 years, chairs a key committee, and whose independence the activists can credibly characterize as compromised by tenure is a director whose continued service becomes an activist campaign argument. In the biotech context, the founding scientist-director who has served since the company’s inception, has deep scientific knowledge that is genuinely valuable, but whose tenure creates an independence optic that ISS scores negatively is a specific governance problem that the CLO should identify in the annual board composition analysis.
The CLO’s Pre-Campaign Analysis
The annual activism vulnerability assessment is a CLO deliverable. It answers four questions before the activist answers them publicly.
Question 1: What Is the Performance Gap?
One-year and three-year total shareholder return against the relevant index and peer group. If TSR trails the peer group median by more than 15% on either measure, the performance gap is identifiable in public data and the activist can quantify it for an institutional investor audience. The CLO’s role is not to solve the performance problem — that is a board and management responsibility. The CLO’s role is to ensure the board has been presented with the quantified performance gap before an activist presents it in a public letter.
Question 2: What Is the M&A Thesis Vulnerability?
Is there an identifiable argument that the board failed to pursue available strategic alternatives — either by not pursuing acquisitions to address a pipeline gap, by not selling when a premium was available, or by not pursuing licensing transactions that would have extended the pipeline or the runway? The M&A thesis campaign accounted for 64% of all Q4 2025 activist campaigns — the highest proportion in five years. A board that has not documented its analysis of strategic alternatives in board minutes — including a documented record of M&A opportunities the board considered and rejected, with the business rationale — is a board that is vulnerable on this specific dimension.
Question 3: Are the Structural Defenses Current?
Advance notice bylaw currency is the most basic structural question. Does the company’s advance notice bylaw require the nominating shareholder to disclose its full economic interest — including derivatives and instruments that create economic exposure without voting rights — against the 2026 standard of activist disclosure sophistication? Does the acting-in-concert definition capture aggregated positions held through related entities? A bylaw last reviewed before 2021 is almost certainly inadequate against current activist disclosure practices.
Poison pill status: does the company have a current plan reviewed against current Delaware case law within the prior 12 months? A pill adopted in 2019 that has not been reviewed against the current Delaware precedent on trigger thresholds, passive investor exemptions, and acting-in-concert definitions provides less structural protection than the board believes it does.
Question 4: Is the Board Composition Defensible?
The specific composition questions the CLO should answer annually: average director tenure (tenure above 10 years is a specific ISS vulnerability); number of directors who have not served on another public company board (insufficient governance experience); presence of at least one director with current capital markets experience — direct buy-side or sell-side, not a former CFO of a private company; and whether any director whose independence is potentially compromised by tenure is in a position where that compromise creates a governance argument.
THE KEROS AND ALKERMES COMPARISON — TWO BIOTECH ACTIVISM OUTCOMES IN 2025-2026
Keros Therapeutics reached a resolution with activists ADAR1 Capital Management and Pontifax Venture Capital by repurchasing their stakes as part of a broader buyback — the activists exited the board without requiring a strategic process. Alkermes mounted a successful defense, with shareholders rejecting three board nominees from Sarissa Capital and reelecting seven incumbents. Both companies took different paths to the same destination: activists came and left without achieving board control. The CLO’s lesson from both: an advance vulnerability assessment, a current governance document review, and a proactive institutional investor engagement program are the inputs that gave both boards the position to respond to activist pressure without capitulating to it. Neither outcome was an accident.
WORKSTREAM 1 IMMEDIATE
Conduct the Annual Activism Vulnerability Assessment Before November
The proxy season begins in January. An activism vulnerability assessment completed in October gives the board twelve weeks to address identified gaps before activists file their first 13D positions for the spring proxy season. The assessment covers: TSR performance gap (1-year and 3-year against peer median); M&A thesis vulnerability (documented strategic alternatives analysis in board minutes); advance notice bylaw currency against 2026 activist disclosure practices; poison pill status reviewed against current Delaware case law; and board composition defensibility — capital markets expertise, director tenure profile, ISS independence scoring, and the operating independence of audit and compensation committee structures. The assessment is a CLO deliverable. It should be presented to the board’s nominating/governance committee before the end of the fiscal year.
BUSINESS IMPACT: A board that receives an activist’s public letter without a current vulnerability assessment is a board making governance decisions in real time under public pressure. A board that completed the assessment in October is a board that has already made the governance decisions that matter.
WORKSTREAM 2 NEAR-TERM
Update the Advance Notice Bylaw and Confirm Poison Pill Currency
For any company whose advance notice bylaw has not been reviewed by outside governance counsel since 2021, commission a review against the current standard before the next proxy season. The specific provisions requiring update: economic interest disclosure (the bylaw must require disclosure of derivatives, swaps, and instruments that create economic exposure without voting rights — the wolf-pack aggregation problem); acting-in-concert definition (must capture related-entity aggregation); nominee questionnaire requirement; and the update obligation requiring the nominating shareholder to confirm disclosure accuracy through the meeting date. For the poison pill: confirm whether a current plan is in place, when it was last reviewed against Delaware precedent, and whether the trigger threshold, passive investor exemption, grandfathering provision, and acting-in-concert definition remain defensible under current case law. Both documents should be reviewed by outside governance counsel — the same firm that would represent the company in a proxy contest — not by in-house counsel alone.
BUSINESS IMPACT: The advance notice bylaw and poison pill determine whether an activist can mount a proxy campaign on their own timeline or the company’s timeline. The company whose governance documents are current negotiates from a position of structural advantage. The one with outdated documents does not.
WORKSTREAM 3 STRATEGIC
Build the Board Composition Pipeline Before the Next Annual Meeting
The most durable response to the scientific-depth / capital-markets-expertise gap is a board composition pip
eline — a documented list of director candidates with capital markets, M&A execution, or institutional investor relationship backgrounds who meet the company’s independence requirements and have been vetted by the nominating/governance committee. The pipeline does not require a vacancy to exist. It requires the governance committee to have completed its work before the activist nominates its own candidates and the company is forced to respond in a proxy contest environment. The specific target profile: one director with direct buy-side (institutional asset management or hedge fund) or sell-side (investment banking or equity research) experience in the relevant sector; and one director with direct M&A execution experience at the CLO, CFO, or CEO level at a company of comparable size and complexity. When the activist nominates two directors with precisely those backgrounds, the company whose board already has that expertise can make a credible case to institutional shareholders that the activist’s nominees are redundant, not additive.
BUSINESS IMPACT: The activist’s most effective campaign strategy in biotech is nominating directors whose expertise is genuinely missing from the current board. The board that has already filled the gap removes the most compelling argument from the activist’s proxy statement before it is written.
“34% of concluded activist campaigns in life sciences since 2024 preceded the company’s acquisition or dissolution. The activists are not running governance improvement campaigns. They are running strategic process campaigns with governance as the entry point. The CLO’s job is to close the entry before the campaign opens.”
For interested readers I have created a Biotech Board Governance Gap Assessment. It can be found at:https://laroccaadvisory.gumroad.com/l/hurpye
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
John LaRocca is a pharma and biotech attorney with 26 years of in-house experience, including CLO/GC tenures at Actavis, Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Aerie Pharmaceuticals, and Y-mAbs Therapeutics. He is the founding partner of LaRocca Advisory Group, a boutique fractional CLO services firm. The GC Playbook reflects his personal views and does not constitute legal advice.


