FROM THE EDITOR
The Curium-Lantheus deal closed in the press as an $8 billion take-private. That number is accurate the way a settlement described as “up to $500 million” is accurate — it is the ceiling, not the floor, and the distance between them is the document.
The distance here is $12 per share. Curium is paying $102.50 in cash at closing. The rest — up to $12 per share in contingent value rights tied to Lantheus sales milestones through 2030 — depends entirely on what happens inside a company that will no longer be public, reporting to no one with any obligation to care whether the CVR pays out.
That tension is the GC’s work on both sides of this deal. On the Lantheus side, the CVR document is the last protective instrument for shareholders who cannot hold onto their stock. Every definition of “net sales,” every competing business covenant, every dispute resolution mechanism is a substantive legal question that determines whether $12/share is real money or a number in a press release. On the Curium side, the CVR is a contingent liability of up to $720 million or more, secured by operating covenants that bind a PE-controlled company to the commercial strategy of an asset it just acquired in order to take it off the market.
This is a deal where the economic gap between headline and closing value is as wide as any I have seen in a straightforward cash transaction. The $12 CVR is not an incidental feature. It is the deal.
John LaRocca
THE TRANSACTION
CapVest Partners-backed Curium announced the acquisition of Lantheus Holdings (NASDAQ: LNTH) in a transaction that packages a clean cash offer with a milestone structure that will run for more than three years after closing.
The headline terms: $102.50 per share in cash plus up to $12.00 per share in contingent value rights tied to Lantheus net sales milestones through December 31, 2030. At $102.50, the cash component alone represents a 21 percent premium to Lantheus’s unaffected closing price on May 21, 2026 — the last trading day before rumors of a deal appeared in the financial press. The 60-day volume-weighted average price premium is 38 percent. Total deal value at full CVR payout is approximately $8 billion; equity value at closing, assuming the CVRs pay nothing, is approximately $6.9 billion.
Close is expected in the first half of 2027. The regulatory calendar is typical for a transaction with significant radiopharmaceutical supply chain implications: Hart-Scott-Rodino clearance, NYSE delisting mechanics, and a tender offer process that will run concurrently with the antitrust review.
Lantheus is not a typical specialty pharma acquisition target. Its flagship product, PYLARIFY (piflufolastat F 18), is an FDA-approved PSMA-targeted PET imaging agent for prostate cancer — the category leader in a market that did not exist in commercial form before 2021. Its legacy product, DEFINITY (perflutren lipid microsphere), is the dominant ultrasound contrast agent in the US cardiac imaging market. The company has a radiopharmaceutical manufacturing and supply infrastructure that is genuinely difficult to replicate and a pipeline of PSMA-targeted therapeutic candidates that are pre-commercial but advancing.
Curium is among the largest nuclear medicine companies in the world by volume. CapVest, its PE sponsor, acquired it in 2023. The Lantheus transaction is a consolidation of the two largest independent players in diagnostic nuclear medicine and, through Lantheus’s pipeline, a bet on PSMA-targeted therapeutic radiopharmaceuticals — a market that Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, and Novartis are simultaneously building from a different direction.
What Curium is buying, in simplest terms, is PYLARIFY’s current commercial trajectory, DEFINITY’s durable cash generation, and the option value in Lantheus’s therapeutic pipeline. The CVR is how the parties agreed to split the uncertainty between those three things.
WHAT A CVR ACTUALLY IS — AND WHY IT CREATES LEGAL RISK
A contingent value right is a contractual promise by an acquirer to pay additional consideration to target shareholders if specified events occur within a defined period. In pharmaceutical M&A, CVRs most often attach to pipeline milestones — regulatory approvals, phase completion, or sales thresholds for recently launched products.
The Curium-Lantheus CVR is of the sales-threshold variety: up to $12.00 per share, non-transferable, contingent on Lantheus meeting net sales milestones through December 31, 2030. The specific milestone structure — the revenue thresholds, the payment schedule, the definition of net sales — is contained in the CVR agreement itself, which is a material contract attached to the merger agreement and which Lantheus shareholders, as the CVR holders, will inherit when the merger closes.
Non-transferable means exactly what it says. A Lantheus shareholder who tenders their shares receives the $102.50 at closing and then holds a non-tradeable right to receive additional payments if milestones are hit. They cannot sell the CVR. They cannot hedge it. They sit for up to four and a half years as creditors of the acquirer on terms they did not negotiate and cannot modify.
This is where the GC’s work matters most, and where the legal record of this deal will be scrutinized if the CVR does not pay out as shareholders expected.
THE DEFINITION FIGHTS
The most consequential drafting in any CVR agreement is the definition of the metric that triggers payment. In a sales-based CVR, that definition is “net sales” — and net sales in the pharmaceutical industry is not an accounting concept. It is a negotiated one.
The standard deductions from gross-to-net in pharmaceutical sales include:
Chargebacks and rebates paid to government programs (Medicaid best price, 340B, VA federal ceiling price)
Managed care and commercial rebates
Distribution fees and prompt-pay discounts
Returns
Co-pay assistance and patient support programs
Allowances for uncollectible amounts
In a product like PYLARIFY, which is sold into hospital and imaging center systems, the gross-to-net adjustment is material. Hospital GPO contracts, outpatient rebates, and government program pricing can represent a significant percentage of gross sales. The precise methodology for calculating those deductions — which programs count, how rebates are estimated and trued up, what the accounting period is — directly determines whether PYLARIFY hits the CVR milestones.
What makes this particularly pointed for the Curium deal is that PYLARIFY’s commercial trajectory is not hypothetical. The product launched in 2021, has several years of commercial history, and a reasonably well-established gross-to-net profile. But that profile was built inside a public company with its own finance function, its own contracting strategy, and its own incentives. Once Lantheus is a private subsidiary of a CapVest portfolio company, none of those incentives run directly to CVR milestone achievement. Curium controls the contracting strategy. Curium controls the pricing. Curium controls the gross-to-net calculation methodology.
The CVR agreement either constrains that discretion or it does not.
THE COMPETING BUSINESS COVENANT
The second major drafting fight in any commercial CVR is what the acquirer is obligated to do — and not do — to give the milestone a fair opportunity to be reached.
A typical operating covenant in a sales-based CVR obligates the acquirer to use commercially reasonable efforts (or some defined variant of that standard) to promote and sell the product during the milestone period. At minimum, it prohibits the acquirer from taking actions whose principal effect is to reduce the product’s net sales below a milestone threshold while the CVR is outstanding — deliberately redirecting customers to competing products, cutting the commercial infrastructure, or abandoning contracting strategies the legacy company had in place.
For Curium, this covenant is not a formality. Curium has its own diagnostic imaging portfolio. In markets where Curium’s products and Lantheus’s products compete for the same clinical decision, Curium will face a real operational tension: maximizing the performance of its existing business or maximizing the performance of the acquired Lantheus business for CVR purposes. The covenant defines how that tension is resolved and, if it is not resolved in PYLARIFY’s favor, what the legal consequences are.
What the Lantheus GC needed in this document: a specific and enforceable standard, not a general “commercially reasonable efforts” formulation that gives the acquirer discretion to balance its own commercial portfolio against CVR obligations. The difference between “commercially reasonable efforts consistent with those historically applied by Lantheus” and “commercially reasonable efforts as determined by Curium in its business judgment” is the difference between a CVR that pays and one that litigates.
THE CALCULATION AND DISPUTE MECHANISM
Every CVR agreement that has ever paid out less than shareholders expected has produced litigation. The instrument requires a dispute mechanism because the acquirer calculates whether its own milestone has been reached and then reports that calculation to a trustee — typically a bank — who represents the CVR holders.
CVR litigation follows a pattern. The acquirer calculates net sales, concludes the milestone was not reached (or that a lower tranche was reached), reports to the trustee, and the trustee has a defined window to object. If the trustee objects, the parties go to the resolution mechanism — typically independent auditor review with binding effect. If the trustee does not object within the window, the calculation is deemed final.
The weakest link in this chain is the trustee. CVR trustees are typically institutional trustees whose mandate is administrative, not advocacy. They verify that the calculation followed the defined methodology. They do not independently verify whether the defined methodology produces an accurate picture of what PYLARIFY actually earned. For former Lantheus shareholders who received no seat at the negotiating table for the CVR agreement and who will have no visibility into Curium’s internal accounting for the milestone period, the trustee’s capability and independence are the only substantive protections that exist.
What sophisticated CVR counsel negotiates: independent audit rights for the trustee, triggered by a shareholder demand threshold, with the acquirer bearing the cost if the audit reveals a material understatement. Without an audit right, the dispute mechanism is limited to reviewing whether arithmetic was performed correctly on numbers the acquirer supplied.
BOX: THE PE TAKE-PRIVATE DYNAMIC
The Curium-Lantheus transaction is a PE-controlled strategic buyer acquiring a US-listed target. That combination creates an operational and governance context for the CVR that is different from a strategic-to-strategic deal.
In a public company acquirer, the executive team managing PYLARIFY post-close answers to a board with independent directors, reports to financial analysts, and operates under SEC disclosure obligations that require honest characterization of product performance. Quarterly earnings calls create a public record of what the buyer thought PYLARIFY was going to do and what it actually did.
In a PE-backed private acquirer, none of those transparency mechanisms exist. The board is the sponsor. The reporting is to LPs. There are no analyst calls about PYLARIFY’s net sales trajectory. The CVR milestone calculation, whenever it is made, will emerge from an internal accounting process that former shareholders cannot observe and, absent the contractual rights described above, cannot audit.
This is not an accusation of bad faith. It is a structural observation: the PE take-private removes the transparency infrastructure that public company status provides, and the CVR’s enforceability depends entirely on the contractual rights that remain.
European comparison: Recordati, the Italian specialty pharmaceutical company, is in the middle of its own PE take-private by CVC Capital Partners and Groupe Bruxelles Lambert. The Recordati transaction is larger — CVC and GBL launched a tender offer valued at approximately €10.73 billion ($12.47 billion) — and does not include a CVR structure of the Lantheus type, reflecting the different market context of a European delist. The common thread: PE capital is pricing pharmaceutical assets at premiums that require a view about commercial trajectories no public market was willing to fully discount.
THE 10-MONTH SIGN-TO-CLOSE WINDOW
Curium announced the deal and expects to close it in the first half of 2027 — approximately 10 to 12 months from sign to close. For a radiopharmaceutical transaction, that window is not unusually long, but it creates a defined legal exposure that the Lantheus GC and Curium’s counsel both had to plan around.
During the sign-to-close period, Lantheus remains a public company. It continues to report quarterly financial results, manage its commercial pipeline, and answer analyst questions about PYLARIFY’s performance. Every disclosure Lantheus makes during this period is simultaneously a public statement about the target’s value, a basis for any renegotiation that adverse developments might prompt, and a baseline against which the CVR milestones will eventually be measured.
The sign-to-close period also introduces interim operating covenant risk. Lantheus agreed, as part of the merger agreement, to operate the business in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practice between signing and closing. This covenant limits Lantheus’s ability to modify pricing strategies, enter new long-term contracts, restructure its commercial organization, or adjust its gross-to-net accounting methodology — even if those changes might be beneficial for the business independent of the transaction.
For the Lantheus GC, the ordinary course covenant is a constraint on legal authority that runs for 10 or more months. Material decisions about product strategy, contracting, and customer terms require acquirer consent. The process for seeking and obtaining that consent — particularly in a radiopharmaceutical market that moves fast — is a practical management challenge that begins the day the merger agreement is signed.
WHAT THE GC ON EACH SIDE NEEDED TO GET RIGHT
Lantheus (target) side:
The Lantheus GC had one primary document obligation that determined the value of the transaction for shareholders: the CVR agreement. The merger agreement’s cash terms were fixed. The CVR terms were negotiated. Every dollar of the $12 CVR’s actual probability of payment was determined by the precision of that document.
Five provisions that needed to be airtight: the net sales definition and gross-to-net methodology (including whether the methodology is locked at signing or can evolve); the operating covenant standard (specific, historical-conduct-anchored, and enforceable); the competing product covenant (does it address Curium’s existing portfolio?); the audit right and dispute mechanism (with trustee capability to exercise it); and the CVR term structure (do all $12 pay at once on a single milestone, or is it tranched across multiple thresholds, with the later tranches contingent on earlier ones being reached?).
A CVR that addresses all five of those questions with specificity is a financial instrument. One that does not is a lawsuit.
Curium/CapVest (buyer) side:
The Curium GC had a different but parallel task: ensuring that the operating covenants in the CVR agreement preserved the buyer’s flexibility to manage the combined business without creating de facto board-level approval requirements for every commercial decision through 2030.
The operating covenant tension is real. A CVR that obligates Curium to use commercially reasonable efforts to hit PYLARIFY net sales milestones constrains every commercial decision Curium makes about the radiopharmaceutical business for four and a half years. Pricing strategy, customer contracting, geographic prioritization, and pipeline investment are all potentially caught within the scope of a broad operating covenant. Curium’s counsel’s job was to define those obligations narrowly enough that the company retains operational flexibility while remaining enforceable enough that the CVR does not become a dead letter that Lantheus’s financial advisors characterized incorrectly to their own board.
The GC on the buyer’s side of a CVR transaction is negotiating against its own deal team — which has every incentive to promise generous operating covenants to close the deal — and against target counsel, which has every incentive to make those covenants as specific and binding as possible. That tension, between deal urgency and legal precision, is where the document ends up defining what shareholders actually received.
WORKSTREAM 1 — IMMEDIATE: Pull the CVR Agreement and Map the Definitions
The CVR agreement is a material contract that will be attached as an exhibit to the merger agreement filed with the SEC. When Lantheus files the transaction documents — expected within weeks of announcement — the CVR agreement becomes publicly available.
For GCs with any CVR in their company’s deal history, or any pending M&A transaction that might include one, the Curium-Lantheus CVR agreement is a current-market reference document for understanding how these instruments are being drafted in 2026. Pull it when it files.
The specific questions to answer on a first read: How is “net sales” defined? What gross-to-net deductions are enumerated? Is the methodology fixed at signing or subject to revision? What is the operating covenant standard — and does it reference Lantheus’s historical commercial practices as a floor? What dispute mechanism applies, and does it include an independent audit right?
BUSINESS IMPACT: A GC who can read a CVR agreement and identify whether its definitions will produce the payment the press release implied is providing value that the company’s investment bankers, who structured the instrument, may not be positioned to provide. The definitions are legal work.
WORKSTREAM 2 — NEAR-TERM: Audit Your Own CVR Exposure
The Curium-Lantheus transaction is a prompt to review any CVR obligations currently in your own company’s capital structure — as payer or potential payee.
If your company is the acquirer with outstanding CVR obligations: confirm that your operating covenant obligations are being documented in real time, that the calculation methodology is being applied consistently, and that any deviation from the defined methodology — even one that benefits the business — is getting legal review before it occurs. CVR litigation almost always traces to a moment when the acquirer made an operationally rational decision that the CVR agreement prohibited or constrained without anyone in legal being in the room.
If your company is a potential target with a CVR in any deal discussion: treat the CVR negotiation as a separate legal engagement from the merger agreement itself. The merger agreement’s cash terms get the investment bankers, the board, and the financial advisors. The CVR agreement often does not get the same level of scrutiny — and it should. The CVR is the instrument that determines whether shareholders were fairly compensated for the portion of value that was not paid at closing.
BUSINESS IMPACT: CVRs that are not enforced are not free money forgiven. They are liabilities that generate litigation three years after closing when a trustee who was inadequately resourced finds that milestones were not reached, and shareholders who received no dividend and had no audit right have the merger agreement and a CVR trustee standing between them and an answer.
WORKSTREAM 3 — STRATEGIC: Understand the PE Buyer’s Governance Model
The Curium-Lantheus deal is the most significant articulation of the PE-controlled strategic buyer model in radiopharmaceuticals. CapVest and Curium are integrating Lantheus into a portfolio company that is itself PE-controlled. The combined entity will not have public company governance — no independent directors with fiduciary obligations to public shareholders, no SEC reporting obligations, no quarterly analyst scrutiny of PYLARIFY’s commercial trajectory.
For GCs at specialty pharma companies who may face a PE-controlled strategic acquirer in a future transaction — a category that is expanding rapidly as PE capital accumulates in the pharmaceutical space — the governance model of the acquirer is a due diligence item, not just a background fact.
Specifically: Does the acquirer’s existing PE governance structure create board-level conflicts with the operating covenants you are agreeing to? Does the acquirer have outstanding CVR obligations on other portfolio companies that create a template for how it calculates milestones? Does the PE sponsor’s investment horizon align with the CVR term — or does the sponsor’s exit window create incentives to manage the business in ways that trade off against milestone achievement?
These are questions about the counterparty’s governance and incentive structure, not about the deal’s economic terms. They belong in legal due diligence. For a public company target’s GC accepting CVR consideration from a PE-controlled acquirer, they are the diligence that determines whether the instrument is worth what the press release says it is.
BUSINESS IMPACT: PE take-privates with CVR structures are not rare. Curium-Lantheus is this year’s high-profile example in a field that has produced a dozen similar transactions in the last five years. A GC practice that develops a framework for evaluating PE-controlled acquirers — governance structure, existing CVR history, sponsor investment horizon — is positioned to add value to the next transaction at the moment the counterparty is selected, not after the term sheet is signed.
PULL QUOTE: “The CVR agreement is the last protective instrument for shareholders who cannot hold their stock. Every definition of ‘net sales,’ every competing business covenant, every dispute mechanism is a legal question that determines whether $12 per share is real money or a number in a press release.”
For interested readers I have created a CVR Tool kit. It can be found on Gumroad at https://gumroad.com/products.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
John LaRocca is the founder of LaRocca Advisory Services and the author of The GC Playbook. He served as CLO at Aerie Pharmaceuticals (Aerie/Alcon, ~$930M), Y-mAbs Therapeutics (SERB, $412M), and Eagle Pharmaceuticals, with 37 years of legal experience and 26 years at the GC/CLO level in specialty pharma and biotech. The GC Playbook is published on Substack at laroccaj.substack.com.



The same tension appears in private European deals in the form of earn-outs, and the disputes there tend to follow a similar path: they usually start with a decision the buyer took for sound business reasons that happened to move the metric. Two provisions carry most of the weight in practice. The first ties the operation of the business during the earn-out period to its pre-closing practice and lists the specific acts that need the sellers' consent, such as moving customers or costs to other group companies. The second accelerates the payment if the buyer resells the business or integrates it so deeply that the metric can no longer be measured on its own. On the dispute side, expert determination by an independent accountant on a short timetable tends to resolve these faster than litigating a general efforts standard.