FROM THE EDITOR
Anamaria Sudarov, managing director for healthcare investment banking at Wells Fargo, put it plainly at BIO 2026 in San Diego: she has seen companies filing for an IPO on Friday and receiving an M&A announcement by Monday. The dual-track process — running an IPO filing in parallel with a strategic acquisition conversation — has returned to biopharma in a way it has not been seen since 2021. The difference this time: biotechs are not just using the IPO track as a negotiating tactic. They are executing on it.
“In 2025, dual track was not an option,” Sudarov said. Now, it is bare minimum.
That sentence is the most important data point in the 2026 M&A market for the CLO who advises a biotech company that might be a sell-side participant. When the IPO market is closed, a biotech has one exit path: find a buyer or die trying. When the IPO market is open, a biotech has two. That changes the negotiating leverage in every acquisition conversation in a way that directly affects the legal terms that can be demanded and received.
This issue is about the dual-track deal: what it is, how it changes the legal dynamics of acquisition negotiations, what the CLO’s specific role is when the company is running both tracks simultaneously, and what acquirers need to understand about their counterparties’ leverage when those counterparties have a credible alternative.
The IPO market returned. The leverage map changed. The legal terms followed.
— John LaRocca
Founding Editor | LaRocca Advisory Services
The Market Context: Six Biopharma IPOs, $1.8B, and a Changed Negotiating Environment
Q1 2026 produced six biopharma IPOs that raised $1.8 billion — already surpassing full-year 2025 IPO proceeds, per JP Morgan’s Q1 report. The XBI was up 64% over the preceding year. Biopharma venture funding reached $5.2 billion in Q1, with later-stage capital dominating. The numbers alone are significant. What they signal is more significant: the IPO market has reopened as a credible alternative exit path for biotech companies with mature assets.
PwC’s 2026 midyear M&A analysis identified the scarce resource in the current deal market: ‘differentiated assets with near-term commercial potential in the right therapeutic areas.’ When those assets are genuinely scarce and the IPO market is open, the biotech that controls them has real negotiating power. Not theoretical leverage — actual leverage that shows up in deal terms, timelines, and price.
Casarine Chong, general counsel for R&D and business development at CSL, described the shift at BIO 2026: “There are bankers that I’ve historically only encountered in the M&A context that are now representing biotechs, and they’re agnostic.” Those bankers are telling acquirers directly: ‘You have a limited period of time to execute on this deal, otherwise we have both IPO funding and M&A on the horizon as well.’ That message, delivered credibly, changes the negotiating dynamic on every term that an acquirer tries to push below market.
What the Dual-Track Process Actually Looks Like
A dual-track process means a biotech is simultaneously: (a) preparing for and filing a registration statement for an IPO, and (b) engaged in M&A exclusivity or advanced discussions with a strategic acquirer or acquirers. The two tracks are not fully parallel. There are specific legal constraints on what can be disclosed in each, but the company is genuinely prepared to execute on either.
The classic structure works as follows. The biotech engages an investment bank to run both processes. The bank submits the S-1 registration statement to the SEC on a confidential basis under Section 106 of the JOBS Act, which allows an Emerging Growth Company to complete the SEC comment-and-response process privately before going public. Separately, the bank may also conduct ‘testing the waters’ communications under Section 105 — pre-filing conversations with qualified institutional buyers to gauge investor appetite and valuation expectations before committing to the public filing process. These are distinct mechanisms: the confidential submission is a filed document; testing the waters is an oral or written investor conversation. Both can proceed while M&A discussions are active. The IPO filing is disclosed selectively to acquirers as evidence that the alternative is real. The acquirer who wants to avoid a publicly traded competitor calculates whether bidding up the M&A price is cheaper than competing against a public version of the same company.
Sudarov put the market reality plainly: ‘A large amount of biotechs will be talking to you on a deal front, and also talking about, I’m raising my next series, whichever gives me the best bang for my buck.’ The days when a biotech had to choose between M&A or fundraising are over.
THE VELOCITY PARADOX
PLS deal value surpassed $65 billion in Q1 2026. It was the strongest quarter since 2020 with 16 $1B+ biopharma deals announced in the quarter alone. The deals are moving faster. They are also more complex than ever. At BIO 2026, multiple panels discussed the multi-track process as the new normal: licensing, additional funding, M&A, and IPO all being evaluated simultaneously by sophisticated biotech management teams. The legal function on both sides is being asked to close more complex transactions on shorter timelines. Speed is up, complexity is up, and the tolerance for underprepared legal teams on either side is down.
How Dual-Track Changes Deal Terms: Five Specific Pressure Points
Pressure Point 1: The Exclusivity Period
In a buyer’s market, acquirers extract long exclusivity periods — 60 to 90 days of no-shop protection while they complete diligence. In a dual-track market, a seller with a credible IPO alternative pushes back hard on exclusivity length. The company’s S-1 registration has a timing dynamic of its own. Every day spent in M&A exclusivity is a day the IPO window could be closing. Sellers in the current market are successfully negotiating exclusivity periods of 30 to 45 days or they are grabbing tiered exclusivity structures that allow the seller to restart IPO discussions after a specified date if the M&A process has not produced a signed agreement.
The CLO negotiating exclusivity on behalf of a sell-side company should understand that exclusivity length is directly tied to the acquirer’s leverage. The longer the exclusivity, the more the acquirer controls the timeline. The shorter it is, the more the seller retains optionality. In a dual-track environment, this is not an abstract negotiating point — it is the difference between a deal that closes and an IPO that happens instead.
Pressure Point 2: The Go-Shop Provision
Go-shop provisions require careful analysis in the dual-track context because the right answer depends on which type of dual-track deal you are in. The two deal types produce opposite dynamics and confusing them is a meaningful legal error.
In a competitive pre-signing auction, where the seller ran a full multi-bidder process before signing, the seller typically does not need a post-signing go-shop. The pre-signing auction was the market test. Boards can satisfy their Revlon duty to maximize shareholder value with a well-documented pre-signing process. In this structure, the seller declining to insist on a go-shop is not a concession to the acquirer. The seller did not want one because the auction had already run. An acquirer who “avoids” a go-shop in this deal has won nothing because the seller was not going to demand it in the first place.
In a bilateral deal, where the seller used the IPO threat to extract price from a single acquirer without running a competitive process, the dynamic is the opposite. Here the seller absolutely should push for a go-shop. The IPO threat disciplined the acquirer’s pricing, but it was not a competitive auction. Without a go-shop, the board has a harder time demonstrating it fulfilled its fiduciary duty to test the market. A board that signed a bilateral deal at a negotiated price, without competitive tension, and without a go-shop, is more exposed to a shareholder challenge than one that either ran an auction or included a post-signing market check.
In the bilateral deal, the acquirer who successfully excludes the go-shop has won a meaningful concession. The correct advice to a sell-side CLO in that structure is to insist on the go-shop or to negotiate a broad fiduciary out that functions as a practical substitute for it, allowing the board to engage with unsolicited superior proposals post-signing without triggering the break fee. An acquirer who gets a bilateral deal signed with neither a go-shop nor a meaningful fiduciary out has meaningfully constrained the seller’s board and reduced its litigation exposure if shareholders challenge the deal. That is a win worth naming.
The dual-track IPO threat does not substitute for a go-shop in the bilateral deal. It gets you to signing. The go-shop protects the board after signing. Each matter, and they serve different purposes.
Pressure Point 3: The Reverse Termination Fee
The reverse termination fee , or the amount the acquirer pays to walk away from a signed deal, is the seller’s primary financial protection against buyer opportunism. In a dual-track environment, sellers negotiate higher reverse termination fees because the cost of a failed deal is not just the deal itself, it is also the disruption to the IPO track, which may have been paused or abandoned when the seller entered M&A exclusivity. Industry standard is 3-5% of deal value. Sellers with credible IPO alternatives are getting 5-6%. At a $5 billion deal, the difference between 4% and 6% is $100 million.
Pressure Point 4: The MAC Definition
Material adverse change definitions determine when an acquirer can walk from a signed deal without paying the reverse termination fee. In a market where sellers have alternatives, MAC definitions are being negotiated more narrowly — more carve-outs for industry-wide conditions, regulatory changes, tariff impacts, and market price movements. The Section 232 tariff environment is now appearing in MAC negotiations as a specifically carved-out category, with sellers insisting that tariff-driven cost increases do not constitute a MAC.
Pressure Point 5: Closing Conditions and Certainty
A dual-track seller values closing certainty above almost everything else. If the M&A track fails to close — whether from a failed HSR process, a financing failure, or a buyer walk — the seller must restart the IPO track from a potentially worse position, because the failed M&A process is now public information.
Certainty of close means different things depending on who the buyer is, and the article should be clear on the distinction.
For strategic acquirers — the large pharma companies doing most of the 2026 deals — financing is not the constraint. Merck, Lilly, and Biogen pay from balance sheet cash or investment-grade revolvers that are effectively always available to them. For a strategic, certainty of close is achieved by drafting the MAC definition narrowly and limiting closing conditions to regulatory clearances only, i.e. no broad material adverse change walk rights, no financing conditions. The reverse termination fee backstops it financially if the buyer still walks. The second tool that creates genuine certainty for a strategic seller is a specific performance right: the contractual right to seek a court injunction forcing the buyer to actually close, rather than simply electing to pay the reverse termination fee and walk away. When specific performance is available and there is no MAC walk right, the seller can seek to enforce the deal in equity, not just collect damages. Most large pharma deals in this market include specific performance as standard. A deal with a narrow MAC, regulatory-only closing conditions, a meaningful reverse termination fee, and specific performance rights is a deal with genuine certainty of close for a strategic seller.
For PE-backed acquirers — which do need committed debt financing at closing — certainty of close has an additional dimension: the buyer must have binding commitment letters from banks or private credit providers as of signing, and those commitment letters cannot themselves contain conditions that could prevent the debt from being drawn. In UK deals subject to the Takeover Code — like the Lilly/Centessa scheme — this is a formal legal requirement called certain funds: a bidder cannot announce a firm offer without demonstrating it has immediately available, unconditional financing. U.S. deal law has no equivalent statutory requirement but sell-side counsel for a dual-track seller should negotiate for a no-financing-condition clause as standard when the buyer is PE-backed. ‘Commit to financing on a certainty-of-close basis’ in a PE deal means committed debt financing at signing, no financing condition in the merger agreement, and specific performance rights to force close if the debt commitment is honored but the buyer tries to walk anyway.
The Biogen/Apellis September 30 drop-dead date — six months for a deal that closed in six weeks — illustrates the strategic value from the seller’s side: a long drop-dead date with no financing condition and specific performance rights means the seller has maximum time and maximum enforcement tools. The deal closes when it closes, on the seller’s schedule, not the buyer’s.
The CLO’s Specific Role in the Dual-Track Process
When a biotech is running a dual-track process, the CLO has a specific set of obligations distinct from anything the investment bank or the CEO is managing. These are not advisory functions — they are legal requirements with consequences if not handled correctly.
SEC Disclosure Coordination
A company simultaneously engaged in M&A discussions and preparing an IPO registration has disclosure obligations that must be carefully managed. Information shared in M&A due diligence will almost always constitute material non-public information (MNPI). The existence of a potential acquisition, the valuation being discussed, and the identity of the counterparty are all almost certainly MNPI. That creates a specific problem for the testing-the-waters communications the bank is running in parallel: those investor conversations cannot include MNPI from the M&A track without triggering disclosure obligations that were not planned for. The bank’s institutional investor conversations about IPO valuation must be scoped to avoid any reference to the M&A process, its status, or any information the M&A counterparty has provided in diligence. The CLO’s job is to establish a clear information barrier between the two tracks and to confirm that the investment bank is running its investor conversations and its M&A outreach through separate teams operating under separate confidentiality protocols. The S-1 itself also requires disclosure of material pending transactions. Once the M&A process is sufficiently advanced, the registration statement may need to describe it, and that disclosure must be coordinated with what has already been said in the testing-the-waters conversations. These are not hypothetical compliance concerns. They are the specific places where dual-track processes have produced SEC enforcement inquiries.
Confidentiality Agreement Architecture
A company in dual-track has shared confidential information with multiple parties: the IPO underwriters, potential M&A acquirers, and possibly venture investors considering bridge financing as a third track. Each of those parties has a separate NDA with specific provisions about use of confidential information, standstill periods, and return or destruction of materials if the relevant process terminates. The CLO needs to know what each NDA permits, which standstill periods are still in effect, and whether any acquirer that received M&A diligence materials has restrictions on participating in a post-IPO public market purchase program.
Board Process Documentation
The board of a company running a dual-track process has fiduciary obligations to consider both alternatives seriously and to document its deliberations. If the company ultimately accepts an M&A deal rather than completing the IPO, that decision will be subject to shareholder review, and potentially litigation, if the M&A price is perceived as inadequate relative to the IPO alternative. The CLO’s job is to ensure that the board’s evaluation of both alternatives is documented in board minutes in a way that demonstrates informed, deliberate choice. In the bilateral deal scenario without a go-shop, that documentation becomes especially important: the minutes need to explain specifically why the pre-signing process, including the IPO alternative as a market reference point, was sufficient to satisfy the board’s duty to maximize value.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
John LaRocca is a pharma and biotech attorney with 27 years of in-house experience, including CLO/GC tenures at Actavis, Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Aerie Pharmaceuticals, and Y-mAbs Therapeutics. He won two Supreme Court cases during his Actavis tenure, including United States v. Mensing. He is the founding partner of LaRocca Advisory Services, a boutique fractional CLO services firm. The GC Playbook reflects his personal views and does not constitute legal advice.
© 2026 The GC Playbook|All rights reserved |Not for redistribution|Not Legal Advice. For Informational Purposes Only.
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