FROM THE EDITOR
Novo Nordisk has filed more than 130 lawsuits across 40 states. Eli Lilly has followed with dozens more against compounding pharmacies, clinics, and medical spas. The FDA ended its enforcement discretion for 503A compounding pharmacies on April 24, 2025, and for 503B outsourcing facilities on May 22. The HHS General Counsel referred Hims & Hers to the Department of Justice for investigation on February 6, 2026 — the same day Hims & Hers launched a compounded oral semaglutide product as an alternative to Wegovy’s newly approved pill. The timing of that referral was not coincidental. Neither is any of this.
The GLP-1 compounding litigation is the most active pharmaceutical enforcement battleground in the country right now. It involves every legal function a CLO at a pharma or biotech company might be responsible for: patent infringement, false advertising, FDA regulatory compliance, state law, antitrust, and now federal criminal referrals. It is generating case law that will define how broadly a brand pharma company can assert its IP rights against compounders — and how far the FDA’s enforcement authority actually reaches in the compounding context.
I want to take you through the three fronts of this battle, what the legal outcomes so far tell us, and what CLOs on both sides need to be doing in response — whether or not your company sells GLP-1 drugs.
The GLP-1 fight is a preview. Every blockbuster drug with a compounding arbitrage problem will go through this sequence.
— John LaRocca
Founding Editor | LaRocca Advisory Services
■ MAIN ARTICLE
The GLP-1 Legal Wars: What 130 Lawsuits, FDA Enforcement, and the Compounding Pharmacy Fight Mean for Your Compliance Program
Format: Regulatory Read | Covers: FDA enforcement, patent litigation, false advertising, antitrust, and CLO action items
How We Got Here: The Shortage Arbitrage That Created the Problem
Between 2022 and 2025, genuine shortages of semaglutide and tirzepatide created a lawful opening for compounding pharmacies under Sections 503A and 503B of the FD&C Act. When an FDA-listed shortage exists, compounders can produce copies of the drug for individual patients under specific conditions. The market took that opening and ran through it at scale. Hundreds of pharmacies — 503A small-batch compounders and 503B large-scale outsourcing facilities — began producing semaglutide and tirzepatide products. Telehealth companies became distribution vehicles. The market for compounded GLP-1s reached hundreds of millions of dollars.
FDA declared the semaglutide shortage resolved, then declared the tirzepatide shortage resolved. That changed the legal landscape immediately. Once the shortage ends, the 503A and 503B basis for compounding collapses. FDA extended enforcement discretion — giving compounders a grace period — but that period ended for 503A pharmacies on April 24, 2025, and for 503B outsourcing facilities on May 22, 2025. The Fifth Circuit appeal filed by the Outsourcing Facilities Association (OFA) is still pending. Courts have been unsympathetic to the compounder position, and the legal tide is running hard against large-scale GLP-1 compounding.
Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly did not wait for the tide. They accelerated litigation in parallel with FDA enforcement, producing the current battleground.
The Three Legal Fronts
Front 1: Patent Infringement
Novo Nordisk filed patent infringement claims against Hims & Hers on February 9, 2026 — one day after the HHS General Counsel’s DOJ referral. The patent claims allege that Hims & Hers infringed Novo’s patents on semaglutide by marketing and selling compounded oral semaglutide after Novo launched its FDA-approved once-daily oral tablet in January 2026. This is the most legally durable front of the three because it does not depend on shortage status. A patent is a patent. If you make a product covered by a valid, unexpired patent without authorization, the shortage question is irrelevant.
The GLP-1 patent landscape is complex. Novo and Lilly both hold extensive patent estates covering their GLP-1 molecules, formulations, delivery mechanisms, and manufacturing processes. Compounders have argued they are working with the API, not the patented formulations. That argument has not fared well — courts have generally found that compounders manufacturing products that function the same way and use the same API are producing products covered by the relevant patents, particularly when the shortage justification has expired.
Lilly took the same approach, suing Strive Pharmacy and Empower Pharmacy — two of the largest 503B compounders — with patent and false advertising claims in multiple jurisdictions. The venue strategy is deliberate: Lilly moved claims to the Southern District of Texas after the Texas Federal Court dismissed OFA’s FDA challenge on June 13, 2025.
Front 2: False Advertising — The Claims Run Against the Compounders
The false advertising claims are brought by Novo and Lilly as plaintiffs. The defendants are the compounders. The allegation: compounders falsely represented that their products are ‘identical,’ ‘equivalent,’ ‘the same API,’ or ‘clinically proven’ relative to FDA-approved Ozempic, Wegovy, Mounjaro, and Zepbound. They are not. FDA-approved drugs have undergone clinical testing for safety and efficacy at the approved dose and formulation. A compounded product containing the same API has not undergone those trials. That factual gap is what the false advertising claims are built on.
FDA’s adverse event data gives those claims real weight: as of early 2025, the Agency had received more than 455 adverse event reports linked to compounded semaglutide and more than 320 linked to compounded tirzepatide. Novo and Lilly are using that data in court, in FDA submissions, and in public communications. Preliminary injunctions against specific compounder marketing claims have already issued. The false advertising theory is strong precisely because the factual predicate — that compounded products are not FDA-approved equivalents — is both true and documented by federal adverse event records.
Any company marketing a compounded GLP-1 product, or a non-FDA-approved version of any blockbuster drug, should treat this litigation as a compliance audit prompt. Specifically: any claim that the product is ‘identical’ to the brand, ‘contains the same active ingredient,’ ‘works the same way,’ or is ‘a fraction of the cost with identical results’ is the kind of comparative statement that Novo and Lilly are actively litigating. Those claims need to be reviewed by advertising counsel against the Lanham Act substantiation standard before any new marketing goes live — and existing materials need to be audited now.
Front 3: The DOJ Referral and Federal Enforcement
The HHS General Counsel’s February 6, 2026 referral of Hims & Hers to the Department of Justice is the most significant development in this litigation wave that most observers have underweighted. Federal criminal referrals of pharmaceutical companies are not routine. When HHS General Counsel makes a referral to DOJ, it signals that the civil tools have been evaluated and found insufficient — or that the conduct is severe enough to warrant parallel tracks.
The specific conduct: Hims & Hers launched a compounded oral semaglutide product on February 6, 2026 — the same day FDA announced sweeping enforcement actions against GLP-1 compounders — and marketed it as an alternative to Wegovy’s newly approved oral pill. Launching a product on the day the FDA announces enforcement against that category of product is either a calculated provocation or extraordinary misjudgment. Either way, it produced a DOJ referral.
The referral does not guarantee criminal charges. DOJ investigates thousands of referrals that never produce indictments. But it changes the posture of the entire compounding industry. Companies that operated on the assumption this fight would stay civil face the possibility of federal criminal exposure.
THE ANTITRUST COUNTER-ATTACK
In January 2026, Strive Pharmacy filed an antitrust lawsuit against Lilly and Novo, alleging they unlawfully restricted competition in the GLP-1 market by working to limit prescriptions for compounded drugs rather than competing on price or access. The antitrust framing is legally creative but faces a structural problem: drug patent holders are entitled to exclude competition from their patented molecules. Exercising that right is not generally an antitrust violation. The more interesting question is whether the coordination between Lilly and Novo in their enforcement strategies — filing simultaneous actions, coordinating with FDA, issuing cease-and-desist letters up and down the supply chain — constitutes actionable concerted action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. That question has not been decided.
What This Means for CLOs at Companies Not in the GLP-1 Business
Every specialty pharma and biotech CLO reading this newsletter is affected by the GLP-1 litigation wave, whether or not your company sells GLP-1 drugs. Here is why.
The FDA enforcement framework being built around GLP-1 compounding will apply to the next blockbuster drug with a compounding market. The sequence — shortage, compounding market expansion, shortage resolution, enforcement discretion, litigation, criminal referral — is a pattern that FDA and DOJ are now running systematically. Keytruda compounding is already developing in oncology markets. GLP-1 is the test case. The playbook will apply broadly.
If your company’s products are being compounded without authorization, you need to know it. Monitoring compounding pharmacy markets for your approved products should be a standard legal function. Novo did not discover the compounding problem in 2022 — the shortages made it obvious. But many companies with smaller commercial footprints have compounded versions of their drugs circulating in specialty markets without systematic monitoring.
The communications discipline this fight requires is instructive for brand pharma on a different axis. Novo and Lilly are making aggressive public statements about the compounding market. Every comparative claim a brand makes about a non-FDA-approved competitor — ‘compounded versions lack clinical safety data,’ ‘unapproved products pose health risks’ — must be substantiated. The Lanham Act runs both ways. A brand that overstates a safety comparison without a specific factual predicate creates its own false advertising exposure, separate from the false advertising claims it is asserting against compounders.
WORKSTREAM 1 NEAR-TERM
Build a Compounding Market Monitor for Your Approved Products
If you have approved products with meaningful commercial revenue, compounding pharmacies may already be producing versions of them. For Schedule II controlled substances, the regulatory framework limits compounding directly. For other drugs, the limit is the shortage justification — and once there is no shortage, the basis for compounding expires. The legal function should own: (1) a quarterly review of FDA’s shortage database for products in your portfolio; (2) monitoring of 503A and 503B compounder marketing for references to your drug names, therapeutic categories, or API names; (3) a protocol for responding to unauthorized compounding discoveries — cease-and-desist letters, FDA adverse event reporting for safety signals from compounded versions, and litigation readiness. The monitor costs very little to run. Discovering unauthorized compounding three years after the fact costs significantly more.
BUSINESS IMPACT: A compounding market that develops around your product without your knowledge becomes an enforcement problem and a safety problem simultaneously. The brand pharma company that discovers unauthorized compounding and responds systematically sets the precedent for that product category.
WORKSTREAM 2 IMMEDIATE
False Advertising: Two Different Audiences, Two Different Obligations
The false advertising claims in the GLP-1 litigation run against compounders and marketers of non-FDA-approved alternatives — not against brands. Novo and Lilly are the plaintiffs. If your company markets a compounded or non-FDA-approved version of any drug, or any product making comparative efficacy or equivalence claims against an FDA-approved product, this litigation is a direct compliance signal. Audit every consumer-facing and prescriber-facing communication for these specific claim types: ‘identical to [brand],’ ‘same active ingredient,’ ‘clinically equivalent,’ ‘works the same way,’ ‘same results at lower cost.’ Any of those claims, applied to a product that has not undergone FDA’s clinical review at the approved dose and formulation, is the Lanham Act theory being litigated right now. Outside advertising counsel should review all such materials before they stay live. If your company is a brand pharma company making public statements about compounded versions of its own products: the obligation is different but real. Every comparative claim — ‘compounded versions lack safety data,’ ‘unapproved products pose health risks’ — must be specifically substantiated. The Lanham Act does not immunize brand companies from false advertising claims. A comparative statement that cannot be supported by specific factual data creates the same exposure in reverse. The GLP-1 litigation has put a spotlight on product comparisons across the entire drug marketing landscape. Both sides of the market need to apply the same standard: every claim requires substantiation.
BUSINESS IMPACT: A compounder or telehealth company that keeps ‘identical results’ marketing live after preliminary injunctions have issued against that specific claim type is making an informed decision to continue infringing behavior. A brand company that makes unsupported safety comparisons faces Lanham Act exposure from the same compounder it is suing. Neither position is defensible.
WORKSTREAM 3 STRATEGIC
Update Your FDA Enforcement Intelligence Program for the Post-Compounding Era
The GLP-1 litigation is reshaping FDA’s enforcement posture around compounding pharmacies in ways that will affect every specialty pharma company’s competitive landscape over the next 3-5 years. FDA’s 503A and 503B enforcement framework is being tested and refined in real-time through the GLP-1 cases. The OFA Fifth Circuit appeal could produce a ruling that either expands or contracts FDA’s authority to end shortage-based compounding enforcement discretion. The CLO who understands FDA’s current enforcement posture — and how it might change — can provide the board and commercial team with intelligence that directly affects pricing, access, and market positioning decisions. Update your FDA intelligence program to include: monitoring of 503A and 503B rulemaking and enforcement actions; tracking of the OFA Fifth Circuit appeal timeline; and review of FDA warning letters to GLP-1 compounders for signals about enforcement priorities that will flow to other categories.
BUSINESS IMPACT: The drug company that understands FDA’s compounding enforcement posture before its competitors can make pricing and access decisions that reflect the actual competitive landscape, not the theoretical one.
“Novo Nordisk filed 130 lawsuits in 40 states. That is not an enforcement strategy. It is a public health position backed by legal force. The CLO who treats that as someone else’s problem has not read the precedent being built.”
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And if your team has a raise, sale, or audit on the horizon, I take on a few diligence & compliance readiness reviews a year. Just reply to this email.
John (john@laroccaadvisory.com)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
John LaRocca is a pharma and biotech attorney with 35 years of in-house experience, including CLO/GC tenures at Actavis, Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Aerie Pharmaceuticals, and Y-mAbs Therapeutics. He is the founding partner of LaRocca Advisory Services, a boutique fractional CLO services firm. The GC Playbook reflects his personal views and does not constitute legal advice.
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